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The fundamental flaws of the European Monetary Union can only be overcome by a drastic change
in macroeconomic policies, according to recent research carried out by Enrico Marelli and
Marcello Signorelli. They argue that in the long run, radical reforms at the Eurozone level are
needed if the monetary union is to survive, although it is still admissible to allow non-Eurozone
countries to follow a weaker form of integration. They also suggest that in order to provide financial
substance to the ‘Europe 2020’ plans, a common budget should be created within the Eurozone.
The failure of the Eurozone to implement real convergence has been one of its critical flaws from
the outset, as we argue in a recent paper. The fundamental weakness in the creation of the
monetary union was the emphasis that was placed on so-called “nominal convergence” criteria, to
the neglect of “real convergence” that, it was assumed, would be an inevitable outcome of the
monetary integration process. This analysis is corroborated by our econometric investigations into
the long-run convergence processes within the Eurozone. We find that convergence in per-capita
income has been more evident in the enlarged EU, which includes the new member states of
Central and Eastern Europe that are “catching-up”, rather than in the Eurozone. In any case, the
adoption of the euro did not play any significant role in the process of real economic convergence.
Furthermore, as many other writers have observed, the requirements for a well-functioning monetary union, as set
out in the theory of the “Optimum currency area” (similarity of production and specialisation, labour mobility, public
insurance in the case of asymmetric shocks), are not satisfied in the Eurozone; in some cases, they have even
deteriorated after the recent crises. The greatest failure in the construction of the Eurozone has been the lack of any
central fiscal capacity based on a sizeable central budget, which at present represents only 1 per cent of the EU’s
GDP. This not only undermines the possibility to have adequate instruments that favour real convergence, but also
excludes the use of effective crisis-management tools in case of large economic shocks.
Recent macroeconomic trends in the Eurozone can be described as a “double crisis”: the financial crisis (2007-08)
and the consequent Great Recession (2008-09), then the “sovereign debt” crisis (since 2010-11). The latter crisis
and the inadequate and delayed policy response by the Eurozone authorities led to a second recession in 2012-13,
which in some peripheral countries stretched out to 2014. Even the current recovery is in most cases feeble, and
there is a high risk of continuing stagnation with persistently high unemployment. In particular, the level of youth
unemployment is remarkably high in many peripheral countries of Europe and the risk of a “lost generation” has
become a real possibility.
In our paper, we argue that the adopted austerity measures were the wrong policy response. They were initially
imposed on the “assisted” countries using the EU’s rescue funds (the European Financial Stability Facility – EFSF;
the European Stability Mechanism – ESM) under the supervision of the “troika”, subsequently extended to all
Eurozone countries through stricter rules on public budgets (Growth and Stability Pact, Fiscal Compact, “six-pack”
and “two-pack”). From a theoretical point of view, such austerity policies were adopted on the basis of mistaken
assumptions about the size of fiscal multipliers, which in the real world were far larger than had been assumed. The
consequence has been that the austerity programme has been too harsh, too long and too pervasive (spreading to
many countries). This mistaken policy caused a fall of output that, in addition to deflation or almost zero inflation,
has kept the debt/GDP ratio at permanently high levels. In this sense, austerity has been self-defeating.
While monetary policy in the Eurozone can currently be considered suitable, in reality adequate measures were
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adopted too late. The key interest rate was reduced to almost zero in Autumn 2014 (six years later than the Fed)
and, more important, “quantitative easing” (QE) was
introduced at the beginning of 2015 (much later than by
other major central banks). A crucial step was taken by
President Draghi in the autumn of 2012 (after his crucial
summer “whatever it takes” speech) with the
introduction of the Outright Monetary Transaction (OMT)
plan, that has been so important in reducing interest
rates on sovereign debt, especially the spreads of
peripheral countries over German bonds.
Hence, this plan has really been decisive to “save the
euro”, but not to improve the credit conditions in the
Eurozone. This is why, also in consideration of the
deflationary conditions (with an inflation rate close to
zero, much below the 2 per cent target) QE was
launched in 2015, and now the European Central Bank
(ECB) is ready to strengthen and prolong it. However,
despite having achieved a minimal “banking union”, the
credit markets in the Eurozone are far from working in
an efficient manner and there is still segmentation along
national lines.
The policy implications are clear. In the long run, radical reforms at the Eurozone level are needed if the monetary
union is to survive. The asymmetry between a centralised monetary policy and decentralized fiscal policies (even
though constrained by EU rules) is the major design failure of the EMU. In the future, a common budget should be
created at the Eurozone level. This is needed to face asymmetric shocks and to provide financial substance to the
“Europe 2020” plans, with a greater role for structural funds, greater investment and infrastructure networks, and
more spending on R&D and the development of human capital. All these are urgently required to ensure “real
convergence”. In a nutshell, more integration is necessary, though it is perfectly acceptable to leave the option for
countries not adopting the euro to maintain a weaker form of integration. From this point of view, the recent
document by the “Five Presidents” (June 2015) also seems too hesitant.
In any case, in the short run, a drastic change in macroeconomic policies is required to put an end to the present
stagnation. The survival of the euro desperately requires that Eurozone policies should be rapidly and strongly re-
oriented towards the objective of economic growth, while fiscal discipline should be assessed with a medium to long
term horizon. Monetary policy is not enough to solve the current problems of feeble economic recovery (as
recognised even by President Draghi) while the currently envisaged structural reforms can only be effective from a
long-run perspective. Consequently, demand-management policies are urgently needed; for example, a spur to
investment would both support aggregate demand in the short run and enhance economic growth in the long run.
Unfortunately, the so-called “Juncker plan” is far too timid, and inexcusable delays have occurred in its
implementation.
To sum up, it should be acknowledged that the “too little too late” approach is misguided. The risk of dismantling not
only the Eurozone but the EU as a whole would be a calamitous defeat because, in a globalised world where the
competitive pressure from new economic powers in all continents is every year more intense, a fragmented Europe
would certainly lose out and fade into global insignificance.
Please read our comments policy before commenting .
Note: This article gives the views of the authors, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor
of the London School of Economics. To read more on the topic, you can access the authors’ recently published
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